



**Sheriff Gregory Tony, Ph.D.**

## **Office of the Sheriff**

January 6, 2026

### **LETTER SENT VIA EMAIL TO –**

Mayor Todd Drosky- [tdrosky@deerfieldbeachfl.gov](mailto:tdrosky@deerfieldbeachfl.gov)

Vice Mayor Ben Preston- [bpreston@deerfieldbeachfl.gov](mailto:bpreston@deerfieldbeachfl.gov)

Commissioner Michael Hudak- [mhudak@deerfieldbeachfl.gov](mailto:mhudak@deerfieldbeachfl.gov)

Commissioner Daniel Shanetzky- [dshanetzky@deerfieldbeachfl.gov](mailto:dshanetzky@deerfieldbeachfl.gov)

Commissioner Tom Plaut- [tplaut@deerfieldbeachfl.gov](mailto:tplaut@deerfieldbeachfl.gov)

City Manager Rodney Brimlow- [rbrimlow@deerfieldbeachfl.gov](mailto:rbrimlow@deerfieldbeachfl.gov)

City Attorney Anthony Soroka- [asoroka@wsh-law.com](mailto:asoroka@wsh-law.com)

The Broward Sheriff's Office is in receipt of a so-called "feasibility study" asserting that transition to a standalone police and fire department is both achievable and financially advantageous. While that claim may sound appealing, a substantive review reveals conclusions that lack credibility and are not supported by operational reality as recognized by experienced public safety professionals.

City leaders should be deeply concerned by the study's glaring public safety implications, including significant gaps, unsupported assumptions, and critical oversights that directly impact emergency operations, staffing levels, training standards, and critical incident response. Decisions based on incomplete or inaccurate information risk undermining the safety of the more than 87,000 residents of Deerfield Beach and the first responders who serve them.

I strongly urge the Deerfield Beach City Commission to invest in utilizing an experienced organization that has the skill set and knowledge to conduct a comprehensive, objective public safety transition study. Failure to do so simply compromises the public safety interests of the community.

Public safety cannot be governed by theoretical savings or untested models. Any proposed changes must be rooted in verifiable data, operational reality, and a clear demonstration that it will enhance, not jeopardize, public safety.

Highlighted below are some of the glaring weaknesses identified in the "*Transition Feasibility Study*" prepared by The Center for Public Safety, Inc., published in December 2025.

**Key weaknesses identified within the Department of Fire Rescue and Emergency Services.**

**1. No EMS Medical Oversight System.**

- No medical director identified or budgeted
- No quality assurance/quality improvement program
- No protocol development or case review process
- No integration with receiving hospitals or trauma centers
- No EMS coordinator or clinical governance staff

This is a fundamental gap that creates legal, clinical, and patient safety exposure. EMS medical oversight is mandatory for ALS service delivery.

**2. No training infrastructure plan.**

- No training chief, training officers, or dedicated training staff
- No recruit academy plan or continuing education program
- No live-fire training compliance (NFPA 1403)
- No officer development or promotional readiness structure

Training is not optional - it's a statutory, accreditation and liability requirement. This omission materially understates true operational costs and risks.

**3. Unvalidated NFPA 1710 Compliance Claims (for staffing and operations on a 42-hour schedule).**

- No call concurrency analysis
- No unit hour utilization data
- No effective response force modeling for different occupancy types
- No reliability analysis or response performance metrics

Compliance is asserted, not demonstrated. Without validation, the operational model's adequacy cannot be confirmed.

**4. No labor relations strategy (or costs including legacy pensions of former Deerfield Beach employees).**

- No discussion of likelihood of municipal firefighter union formation
- No analysis of collective bargaining impacts on wages, benefits, scheduling, and discipline
- No transition plan for current BSO-represented personnel (seniority, pension portability, MOUs)

Labor relations will strongly affect long-term costs, flexibility, and department culture. This is a major omission.

**5. Minimal command and administrative staffing for key high liability areas.**

- No section chiefs for Operations, Training, EMS, Prevention, or Support Services
- No policy/SOG development capacity
- No performance management or data analytics staff

- Fire prevention is listed but provides no depth on plan review, inspection workload, or community risk reduction
- No detailed internal support (logistics, fleet coordination, IT specialists, administrative staff)

The command structure is too lean to support a new department, especially during the critical first 3–5 years. Operational fragility is likely.

#### **6. No ISO (Insurance Services Office) Rating or Accreditation Analysis**

- Current ISO Public Protection Classification (PPC) rating unknown
- No roadmap to maintain or improve ISO rating
- No discussion of CFAI (fire) or CAAS (EMS) accreditation requirements or costs

ISO ratings affect insurance rates for residents and businesses. Accreditation impacts credibility and operational excellence.

#### **7. Factual Errors in Benchmarking Data**

- Study lists Boca Raton as having 4 stations, 130 personnel, and 100,000 population.
- **Actual:** Boca Raton operates 8 stations and employs 247 personnel for a population of 102,722.

Inaccurate comparison data undermines staffing ratio analysis and cost justifications used throughout the study.

### **Key weaknesses identified within the Department of Law Enforcement.**

#### **8. Weak in data and comprehensive analysis in comparison to other feasibility studies.**

- Cooper City's Public Safety Consultant Report (2016 – Matrix Consultants)
- Hallandale Beach FD Consultant Report (2025 – Emergency Services Consulting International)

These reports demonstrate a key difference in the approach taken in comparison to the Deerfield Beach report: quantitative vs. qualitative. The other reports include objective data analysis, charts, and staffing needs to compare service levels and financial cost, to include service levels, historical calls for service, growth patterns, and financial indicators. Both reports highlight the cost savings and high service by remaining with the BSO model as opposed to standing up independent departments.

#### **9. No mention of the required dual budgeting process, yet the report indicates a 3.24 million savings the first operational year while adding six new positions.**

There is no mention of the required dual budgeting process to get to the point of the first operational year anywhere in the report. In other words, the City would need to start hiring staff incrementally and very soon (i.e., a chief, an accreditation manager, a training coordinator, etc.) to help prepare for standing up a department. As the transition deadline gets closer, more staffing would need to be hired and trained in anticipation of their true start date. This process of dual budgeting increases the cost leading up to a transition and is an important cost to identify, measure, and budget into consideration.

**10. No indication of how that staffing is allocated.**

The report's indication of hiring six additional staff assumes a staffing complement of 158 for their police department. However, the report fails to show how that staffing is allocated and what their inclusion of new responsibilities (i.e., major investigations, accreditation, training, administrative, etc.) will look like.

**11. Report identifies precise figures with no documentation to support how they arrived at these numbers.**

- Personnel cost of \$27,387,320, yet no indication of what is included in this figure.
- Personnel savings of \$32,930 average per position, yet no indication of how they calculated this figure (i.e., no indication of cost for fringe benefits; how can they project FRS rates in advance of June when they are typically released?).
- 20-year forecast presented, absent many unforeseeable variables (i.e., new staffing, equipment, technology, etc.).

**12. The report notes an arbitrary 1-3% controlled cost for public safety.**

This risks life and safety, as you cannot control costs while maintaining the same level of service.

**13. Indicates BSO provided one proposal for public safety services.**

Over the past year, BSO has provided multiple proposals based on the city's requested staffing requests with significant savings to the city.

**14. The report cites "comprehensive and defensible findings".**

- The report was completed absent reviewing any of the requested documentation provided by BSO.
- Where is the analysis of these key findings to review the methodology to ensure it is accurate and factually based?

**15. The report cites the City has extremely limited control over staffing decisions.**

- Under the BSO contract, the district chief reports to and works alongside the city management in the deployment of resources.
- BSO shields the city from liability from issues related to policies and procedures, collective bargaining, etc.

**16. The report cites a 7.5% projected annual increase from BSO with no indication of how they came to this calculation.**

- Historical data for the past 10 years shows BSO is nowhere near 7.5% (the 10-year average is closer to 5.87%).
- Of the few years where the percentage was higher, it was due to an increase in staffing requested by the city or an increase in overtime costs to support city requested events.
- The report does not account for the revenues generated by BSO police or fire on behalf of the city (i.e., from traffic citations, inspections, etc.).

**17. The staffing model makes vague assertions without critical information.**

- What is the proposed staffing breakout or organizational chart to compare current service levels with the proposed service levels?
- The study identifies the cost of \$713,347 for new personnel to support key positions (IT, HR, finance, legal, records, and administration) – what is that figure based on? This is something that would be apparent had the consultant waited for the requested documents from BSO or requested BSO's input, as is normal for feasibility studies.

**18. The study includes an arbitrary comparison of the projected total cost increase for independent services versus BSO services with no justification.**

- What data was this number based off and what is the comparison of services?

**19. Little to no reserved fleet**

- Not enough vehicles for the sworn staff identified in the study (142 sworn staff with only 140 vehicles).
- This asserts no vehicles will be available when a vehicle is out of service for maintenance, in an accident, etc.
- There is no indication for vehicles for parking enforcement. If the parking enforcement department moves over to the city's building department, then the cost for parking enforcement should be removed from this study.

**20. Equipment purchases, and training requirements are limited in the study.**

- Real Time Crime Center costs are not captured in this study but is a current level of service BSO provides. Will this service go away?
- Costs for speed trailers, license plate readers, camera towers, equipment trailers and other technologies and equipment are not accounted for.
- No recommended capital replacement plan.
- No indication of a training facility, qualifications, etc.

**21. Recruitment strategy is to retain "experienced BSO personnel" via competitive pay and hiring incentives.**

- The study provides no clarity on what the pay threshold or hiring incentive range is.
- How is this accomplished while maintaining an approximate \$33,000 savings per position?

Sincerely,



Sheriff Dr. Gregory Tony  
Broward County

**Service Equals Reward**